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DEBRA J. SALAZAR and ROBERT G. LEE*
Natural Resource Policy Analysis
and Rational Choice Theory:
A Strategy for Empirical Research
ABSTRACT
Natural resource policy analysis focuses on the context and con-
sequences of collective decisions regarding the allocation and dis-
tribution of natural resources. Two concepts central to resource analysis
are the nature of institutional arrangements and attributes of goods.
Rational choice theory is well suited for resource analysis because
these two concepts are important parts of the theory. The new re-
source economists have used elements of rational choice theory to
analyze natural resource policy. Their application is deficient in its
narrow use of the theory and in its methodological posture of defense
of favored hypotheses. We argue that rational choice theory can be
most usefully applied using a methodological strategy of strong in-
ference-the derivation and testing of competing hypotheses. Com-
peting hypotheses may be derived from within rational choice theory
as well as from other theories.
"A failure to agree for thirty years is public advertisement of a failure
to disprove."'
1. INTRODUCTION
The theory of rational choice applies the methods and postulates of
economics to the study of political and other extra-market phenomena.
During the last decade, rational choice theory has been employed in-
creasingly in the study of natural resource policy. The focus of most
natural resource applications has been evaluative. Indeed applications of
rational choice theory to natural resource and environmental issues have
generated a consistent set of policy prescriptions: where resources are
publicly-owned, alienate them to the private sector; private ownership
and management will almost invariably yield more desirable social out-
comes than public ownership and management. Where public agencies
*Debra J. Salazar is Assistant Professor of Forest Resources and Adjunct Assistant Professor of
Political Science. Robert G. Lee is Professor of Forest Resources, College of Forest Resources,
University of Washington.
i. Platt, Strong Inference, 146 Science 351 (1964).
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regulate private firms to protect environmental quality, minimize the ex-
tent of regulatory requirements and design regulatory regimes to mimic
market processes; attach a price to pollution and firms will economize
on it. These solutions emerge whether the focus of analysis is air, water,
forests, wilderness, or wildlife.2
Advocates of these positions have referred to their analytical framework
as the new resource economics. Their advocacy of privatization has
generated considerable controversy within the field of natural resource
policy. Such controversy is healthy for the development of an academic
field and for the generation of policy alternatives. However, it is also
important that the bases for such controversy be constructively addressed.
If in thirty years natural resource policy analysts continue to talk past
one another without having identified normative, logical, and empirical
areas of agreement and disagreement, we will have failed as a scholarly
community.4
Our purpose in this paper is to explore the extent to which empirical
questions relevant to natural resource policy have been and can be ad-
dressed using rational choice theory. More specifically, we will focus on
the central concepts and on the methods of empirical analysis associated
with rational choice theory (including the new resource economics). We
explore four related questions. What substantive concerns are central to
rational choice theory? What methodological postures consistent with the
theory would best guide its development? Are these concerns and postures
appropriate for natural resource policy analysis? How can we, as resource
policy analysts, make the most effective use of rational choice theory?
In the next section of the paper we review the core concepts of rational
choice theory. In section three we propose a methodological position that
is appropriate for policy analysis. Section four examines substantive issues
that are crucial to analysis of natural resources and evaluates rational
choice theory as a tool for resource policy analysis. We conclude by
proposing a research strategy that will maximize the contribution of ra-
tional choice theory to resource policy analysis.
II. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
The body of research and writing that we refer to as rational choice
theory comprises several schools or paradigms that have developed during
2. See, e.g., T. Anderson, Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought (1983); Batten, Toward a
Free Market in Forest Resources, I Cato J. 501 (1981); Baden, Saving the Wilderness: A Radical
Proposal, 13 Reason 28 (1981); Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private
Property Rights in Wildlife, I Cato J. 439 (1981).
3. Anderson, supra note 2, at 17-24.
4. As a field, we have made progress in identifying normative sources of disagreement. See, e.g.,
Leman, The Revolution of the Saints: The Ideology of Privatization and Its Consequences for the
Public Lands, in Selling the Federal Forests, University of Washington, institute of Forest Resources,
Contribution No. 50 (A. Gamache ed. 1984).
[Vol. 30
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
the last few decades. One is the property rights school in economics.
Another is the public choice literature in political science. The following
sections examine important concepts and concerns of property rights
economics and of public choice, describe their synthesis as rational choice
theory, and explain their application in the new resource economics.
A. The Property Rights Paradigm
The property rights paradigm has extended the explanatory scope of
economic theory to extra-market decisionmaking.' This extension is the
result of three insights. The first is derived from a shift in analytical focus
from the firm level to the individual decisionmaker. Instead of positing
the firm as a profit maximizer, property rights economists posit individual
members of the firm as utility maximizers. Thus we should expect firms
and other organizations to behave efficiently only to the extent that in-
dividuals within these organizations face appropriate incentives.
Second, property rights economists examine institutional arrangements,
especially property arrangements. 6 Property, as a social institution, al-
locates rights and obligations to social actors in order to regulate the use
of objects.7 The set of rights and obligations that are associated with
property ownership varies among societies and through time in the same
society. Property rights economists evaluate the effects of the structure
of property arrangements on the incentives faced by individuals and on
resource allocation.
These two elements have facilitated economic analysis of the conse-
quences of the separation of ownership from management in the private
sector and of public ownership and government management. Property
rights theorists argue that managers who are not owners will have an
incentive to shirk because owners face information and enforcement costs.
They also contend that shirking by managers in the private sector will
be limited by market valuation of shares, managerial rewards for firm
performance, and competition among managers.' Many property rights
5. See Alchian & Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 16 (1973); Furubotn
& Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. Econ. Lit.
1137 (1972).
6. Of course property rights economists are not the first social scientists to examine institutional
arrangements. There is a long tradition of institutional analysis in political science and in economics.
Economists who have focused on institutional arrangements include: J. Commons, Legal Foundations
of Capitalism (1924) and S. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation: Economics and Policies (3d
ed. 1968). In political science institutional studies dominated the first few decades of the discipline.
See, e.g., W. Wilson, Congressional Government (1885). What property rights economists have
contributed is a deductive theory that facilitates examination of institutions as both independent and
dependent variables.
7. Hallowell, The Nature and Function of Property as a Social Institution, I J. Pol. & Legal
Soc. 115 (1943).
8. See generally Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 5.
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studies have examined the behavior of managers in a variety of institu-
tional settings.'
A third element of the property rights paradigm is the analysis of
transaction costs. Transaction costs may be defined as any costs incurred
in negotiating, contracting, or monitoring the terms of an exchange."°
Property rights economists ask how transaction costs affect the devel-
opment of institutional arrangements. For example, where the costs of
negotiating or monitoring an agreement are high, contractual arrange-
ments are unlikely to emerge.
The three analytical innovations described above have allowed property
rights economists to explain a range of extra-market decisionmaking.
Analysts have focused on the development of property arrangements,"
the efficiency of alternative property arrangements, 2 and the incentives
faced by individuals within firms and other organizations.' 3
B. Public Choice Theory
Public choice constitutes a second branch of rational choice theory.
Analysis of political phenomena such as voting, electoral competition,
and legislator behavior is the focus of public choice theory. While public
choice theorists have appropriated economic principles to study decision-
making in political contexts, public choice differs from neoclassical eco-
nomics in its focuses on institutions and on the nature of goods.' 4 Arrow
examined the consequences of alternative rules for aggregating individual
choices. "5 Other public choice theorists have explored the effects of leg-
islative rules of procedure on policy choice; the underlying premise of
this line of inquiry is that institutions affect outcomes. 6 Thus we should
expect rules and procedures governing introduction of bills, legislative
9. See, e.g., Crain & Zardkoohi, A Test of the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm: Water Utilities
in the United States, 2 J. Law & Econ. 395 (1978); Davies, The Efficiency of Public Versus Private
Firms, the Case of Australia's Two Airlines, 14 J. Law & Econ. 149 (1971).
10. De Alessi, The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence, 2 Res. Law &
Econ. I (1980).
I1. S. Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost (1978).
12. Furubotn & Pejovich, supra note 5; Crain & Zardkoohi, supra note 9; Davies, supra note
9.
13. De Alessi, supra note 10.
14. Sproule-Jones, Public Choice Theory and Natural Resources: Methodological Explication
and Critique, 76 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 790 (1982).
15. Arrow's work gave impetus to a branch of public choice called social choice theory. Social
choice theorists examine the properties of social choice functions (rules for aggregating individual
preferences) in order to evaluate the consequences of alternative rules with respect to social welfare.
Arrow's analysis generated an impossibility theorem, which asserts that no fair voting rule can
produce a stable and consistent ordering of social preferences; K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual
Values (2d ed. 1963). A generation of social choice theorists has challenged, elaborated, and explored
the consequences of Arrow's theorem; W. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (1982).
16. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. 23
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 27 (1979).
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committees, the extent of floor debate, and administrative and judicial
hearings to have implications for the substance of public policy. 7
Mancur Olson's analysis of the collective action problem gave impetus
to another line of public choice inquiry.'" Olson observed that provision
of collective goods often requires individuals to incur costs that are not
directly linked to benefits received from the good. If an individual chooses
not to contribute, she can still benefit from the good if it is provided.
Thus individuals will often choose to free ride. When these individual
choices are aggregated, the result is suboptimal provision of the collective
good. The question Olson raised and many others have explored is: under
what conditions will rational individuals cooperate in the provision of a
collective good?9"
This focus on collective action in pursuit of collective goods has em-
phasized the analytical role of the nature of goods. Public choice theorists
have focused on two characteristics of goods that influence resource
allocation; the extent to which goods may be jointly consumed' and the
ease with which others may be excluded from their use. Economists have
traditionally used the attribute of jointness of consumption to define a
public good.' Public choice theorists argue that public goods are defined
by both joint consumption and costly exclusion. Furthermore, it is the
attribute of costly exclusion that creates collective action problems. The
public choice analysis of goods facilitates identification of the conditions
under which particular goods will be optimally provided and suggests
institutional arrangements appropriate for provision of each type of good.
C. The Theory of Rational Choice
The lines of research outlined above differ in substantive focus but
share fundamental premises and concepts. These common elements make
it useful to treat the public choice and property rights paradigms as a
single theory, the theory of rational choice. Three elements define this
theory: (1) the postulate of purposive individual choice; (2) the pre-
sumption that institutions matter; and (3) the focus on the nature of
goods.22
17. Again, the focus on institutions is not new to political science. See supra note 6. What is
new is the use of deductive theory to predict how particular procedural rules affect policy outcomes.
18. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1971).
19. Some theorists have asked this question with regard to state formation; M. Taylor, Community,
Anarchy, and Liberty (1982). Others have posed the question in the context of participation in interest
groups; M. Olson, supra note 18; T. Moe, The Organization of Interests (1980).
20. Goods are jointly consumed when individuals use the same good or service without affecting
the level of satisfaction derived by other users; Ostrom & Ostrom, Public Goods and Public Choices,
in Alternatives for Delivering Public Services 7-49 (E. Savas ed. 1977).
21. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 Rev. Econ. &
Stat. 550 (1955).
22. Sproule-Jones, supra note 14, has used a similar formulation to define public choice theory.
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Rational choice theory employs the individual as the basic unit of
analysis and postulates that individuals behave purposively. At the most
general level, rational choice theory may be characterized by methodo-
logical individualism, a focus on the individual decisionmaker." The
premise underlying this focus is that firms and bureaucracies do not make
decisions, only individuals do. Organizations and other social institutions
provide incentives that guide individual choices as well as rules for ag-
gregating those choices. But all collective actions may be reduced to a
set of individual decisions. Thus the appropriate unit of analysis for
rational choice theory is the individual decisionmaker. 4
The postulate of purposive choice asserts that individuals maximize an
objective function. The nature of this function is determined by an or-
dering of tastes or preferences that is assumed to be transitive and stable.'
Maximization is constrained by limited resources. In order to predict
behavior in particular contexts, the rational choice analyst must identify
a decisionmaker's objective (for example, wealth accumulation, status,
re-election), specify an objective function, identify constraints, and an-
alyze the institutional setting.
A second defining element of rational choice theory is the presumption
that institutions matter. Rules and norms that define procedures for making
collective choices favor some interests over others and some outcomes
over others. Whether it be public versus private ownership or unanimity
versus majority voting rules, the nature of institutional arrangements
affects individual behavior and subsequent collective action. Thus rational
choice theorists devote considerable effort to analysis of social institu-
tions.
Finally, the nature of goods and services is a focus of analysis. Can a
good be supplied exclusively and consumed privately facilitating market
allocation? Does a good have collective elements that promote free riding
and militate against market allocation?
The three elements outlined above-the postulate of purposive indi-
vidual behavior, a focus on institutional arrangements, and frameworks
for analyzing the nature of goods-are central to rational choice theory.
They invite exploration of three kinds of questions. How does the nature
of a good affect the development of institutional arrangements? How do
institutions affect individual decisions regarding resource provision and
use? What are the social consequences of particular choices?
23. Lukes, Methodological Individualism Reconsidered, in The Philosophy of Social Explanation
119-29 (A. Ryan ed. 1973); Sproule-Jones, Methodological Individualism: Challenge and Response,
28 Am. Behav. Sci. 167 (1984).
24. This position may be contrasted with one adopted by many sociologists who argue that social
groups often constitute a basic unit of analysis; R. Merton, Social Theory And Social Structure
(1957).
25. N. Frohlich & J. Oppenheimer, Modem Polifical Economy 6-9 (1978).
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D. The New Resource Economics
During the last decade the new resource economists have addressed
these questions in the context of natural resource management and use.'
They have elaborated rational choice theory in order to develop an ar-
gument against public ownership and regulation and in support of market
allocation. The fundamental conclusion of the new resource economics
is that public sector decisions almost always yield outcomes that are less
efficient and less equitable than those associated with the private sector.
The argument upon which this conclusion rests is as follows.27
The private owner of a resource has an incentive to use the resource
in a manner that will yield the greatest private return. If property rights
are well-defined and enforced, this use will also maximize the social
value of the resource. This result occurs because, with perfect definition
and enforcement, the parties to any exchange bear all of the costs and
receive all of the benefits of the exchange. Thus a resource will go to
the actor who values it most (she who is willing to pay the highest price).2"
The resource will be used in the manner that yields the greatest return.
Thus, an economy in which all property rights to resources are well-
defined, enforced, and privately owned will yield an efficient allocation
of resources.
In contrast, the government bureaucrat responsible for the management
-of productive resources faces a different incentive structure. The bureau-
qrat has little incentive to maximize the social value of resource use
because he cannot claim the private return. The bureaucrat's interests are
served by increasing the budget he controls or the size of the staff he
supervises. He has neither the incentive (profit) nor the information (prices)
to manage resources efficiently. Thus the new resource economists con-
clude that public ownership and bureaucratic management foster ineffi-
ciency. Political influence replaces social value (measured by prices) as
the determinant of resource use. This produces not only inefficiency but
inequity. By manipulating the political process, special interests force the
average taxpayer to subsidize their lifestyles. Finally, government allo-
cation is characterized by conflict and coercion rather than the voluntary
exchange associated with markets.
26. T. Anderson, supra note 2; R. Stroup & J. Baden, Natural Resources: Bureaucratic Myths
and Environmental Management (1983). Anderson characterizes the new resource economics as an
application of conclusions from property rights economics, public choice, and Austrian economics.
The primary contribution of the last is its focus on entrepeneurs. Stroup and Baden define the
paradigm similarly though they do not use the term "new resource economics."
27. This argument summarizes the model proposed by new resource economists. See T. Anderson,
supra note 2; R. Stroup & J. Baden, supra note 26; and J. Baden & R. Stroup, Bureaucracy vs
Environment: The Environmental Costs of Bureaucratic Governance (1981).
28. In order to accept that the individual who values a resource most is the same as the one who
is willing to pay the highest price, one has to accept the validity of the existing distribution of
wealth.
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Numerous authors have criticized the logic, the normative foundations,
and the empirical validity of the preceding argument. Criticisms of the
new resource economics may be of four types. First, one may challenge
the new resource economists' value positions with regard to efficiency,
equity, and the sanctity of private property rights. This type of criticism
involves social philosophy and there is much to be debated in this regard.29
Second, one might question the assertion that bureaucrats maximize budg-
ets.3° Third, one could criticize the analysis of public and private insti-
tutional structures presented by the new resource economists. Worldly
institutions may differ from their portrayal by the new resource economists
and in many situations bureaucrats in the public and private sectors may
face similar incentive structures." Finally, the new resource economists
may not have correctly analyzed the nature of particular goods.
Our concern in this paper is with the last three types of challenges.
Each of these is subject to empirical testing. Empirical tests can challenge
assumptions regarding the nature of individual choice, institutional struc-
ture, and characteristics of goods. Does rational choice theory lend itself
to such tests? Have the new resource economists presented the results of
such empirical challenges? In the next section of this paper we propose
a methodological strategy that will aid us in addressing these questions.
III. STRONG INFERENCE AND POLICY ANALYSIS
The field of policy analysis focuses on why, how, and with what
consequences collective choices are made.32 Policy analysts examine the
interplay of historical and contextual factors with political actors; the
institutions and procedures that structure choice; and the effects of par-
ticular choices on individuals, groups, and the political economy. Policy
research is intended to advance social science and to provide useful
information and conceptual frameworks to decisionmakers. To achieve
these ends research must be methodologically appropriate.
29. See, e.g., Fumiss, The Political Implications of the Public Choice-Property Rights School,
72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. (1978); Leman, supra note 4 at 93-98.
30. R. Behan, The "Privatization" Alternative for the Future of the Federal Public Lands: A
Penultimate Comment, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science
Association (Mar. 1983). See infra note 46.
31. For example, one new resource economics position is that public owners (citizens) of a
resource face high costs in enforcing their preferences, whereas private owners need only buy and
sell stock to enforce their preferences. Denning argues that, while this may be true, private owners
face higher information costs to monitor the behavior of corporate managers than public owners face
to monitor the actions of public bureaucracies. Thus the relative efficiency of public and private
bureaucracies can only be determined empirically. M. Denning, The Public Ownership of Productive
Resources: An Economic Analysis of Government Enterprise, Paper presented at the annual meeting
of the Western Political Science Association, (Mar. 1983).
32. A. Heidenheimer, H. Heclo & C. Adams, Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social
Choice in Europe and America 3-6 (1983).
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A. Strong Inference
We contend that three methodological requisites are consistent with
the purposes of policy analysis. First, analysts should be concerned with
prediction and explanation not prescription. When we prescribe particular
policies we take on the role of citizen or public official. To the extent
that we attempt to impose our values and beliefs on policy makers we
forfeit our roles as analysts and as social scientists. When we explain
policy-making processes, define alternatives, or predict consequences,
we contribute to the development of a science of politics and we provide
useful information to decisionmakers.
In order to explain and predict, analysts must subject theories to em-
pirical tests. Thus our second methodological position is that policy the-
ories should permit falsification. Theories are tested by deriving refutable
implications from them and then collecting data that could be inconsistent
with those implications.
Public policies lend themselves well to empirical tests because hy-
potheses are implicit in all policies." If we wish to analyze the conse-
quences of a land use policy that employs tax incentives to reduce conversion
of open space in urbanizing areas, we may do so by testing a proposition
that relates a policy tool to the solution of a problem. The content and
form of the proposition will depend on how the research question is
formulated, the specific elements of the policy, and the conditions under
which it is applied. Hypotheses that might be relevant to this situation
include: if costs of holding open space decrease, then the probability of
conversion will decrease; if tax assessments are lower, then fewer acres
will be converted; if tax costs are a minor decisionmaking factor for
landholders, then lower assessments will have little impact on conversion
rates. Each of these hypotheses links a particular set of institutional
arrangements to some social outcome. Each hypothesis is also associated
with a more general theory of decisionmaking. The process of formulating
hypotheses focuses attention on relations between decisionmaking vari-
ables and alternative policy tools, thus promoting more rigorous policy
analysis.
Our third methodological position is that strong inference is an appro-
priate strategy for the development of policy science. 4 Implementation
of strong inference requires: (1) formulating alternative hypotheses; (2)
devising an experiment (quasi-experiment or simulation) with alternative
possible outcomes, each of which excludes one or more of the hypotheses;
33. For discussions of policies as hypotheses, see A. Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power 16,
389-94 (1979); S. Kelman, Making Public Policy 6-8 (1987). For a more technical discussion of
the implications for policy analysis, see Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 Am. Psychologist
409 (1969).
34. Platt, supra note 1, at 347.
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and (3) rigorously carrying out the experiment (quasi-experiment or sim-
ulation). Strong inference provides an appropriate standard both for guid-
ing and for assessing progress in social science. Its logic is especially
compelling.
The best analogy is the act of shaping a tree by pruning it. Each fork
provides an opportunity for growth to continue in a given direction.
Alternative paths for future growth are eliminated by tests that falsify
competing hypotheses. Sequential development of surviving hypotheses
and subhypotheses give shape to theory, just as surviving branches give
shape to the tree. Natural resource policy analysts seeking to advance
rational choice theory are primarily involved in shaping the development
of that theory by challenging a series of branching hypotheses. Second-
arily, they may challenge hypotheses derived from competing theories,
other major stems or even separate trees (disciplines).
B. Stages of Methodological Development
Methodological progress in a theory may be assessed by utilizing as a
standard of comparison the stages through which more mature theories
have developed: ruling theory, working hypothesis, and multiple working
hypotheses." These stages represent a progression from defense of fa-
vored ideas to strong inference. At each successive stage, empirical evi-
dence assumes a greater role in the evaluation of theoretical statements.
During their formative stage, theories are elaborated and extended to
encompass many events and phenomena. Scientists take pride of author-
ship in the theory and initially seek facts that will support the application
of theory to a variety of phenomena. The intellectual offspring becomes
an object of affection and is defended against competing ideas. Plausible
explanations are adopted as theories and, when rigorously defended,
become "ruling theories." 36
Maternalism leads investigators to ignore facts that are inconsistent
with ruling theory, and when challenged, can lead them to actively repress
facts that threaten their favored theories. When such repression becomes
apparent, improvement is sought in the method of the working hypothesis.
The purpose of a working hypothesis has been to challenge favored ideas
35. Chamberlin, The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses, 5 J. Geology 837 (1897).
36. Such affective attachment to a theory should not be confused with Thomas Kuhn's "paradigm."
To Kuhn, a paradigm is an overarching set of assumptions about cause and effect relationships;
"normal science" (successive experiments or tests) elaborates detailed behavior of phenomena en-
compassed by a paradigm, for example, in the history of Newtonian mechanics. Unlike those who
cling to ruling theories, such scientists may challenge favored hypotheses contained within a par-
adigm. What remains unchallenged are the, often unrecognized, assumptions about cause and effect
relationships (the possibility that Newtonian mechanics fails to account for many physical processes).
T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970).
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with facts. Facts are assembled and their relations examined to challenge
the hypothesis and to shape an evolving theory. Yet there also is a danger
that the working hypothesis may become an intellectual child to which
investigators cling, even to the point of defending it with maternalistic
passion.
To guard against this tendency, researchers have adopted the method
of multiple working hypotheses. It is at this stage that researchers practice
strong inference. Multiple working hypotheses divide the maternal af-
fections among several competing hypotheses. Parentage of a family of
competing hypotheses promotes impartiality in the investigation of facts.
Within a given theory, crucial experiments involving competing hypoth-
eses facilitate progressive exclusion of branches. Although true experi-
ments are seldom possible in natural resource policy analysis, quasi-
experimentation, simulation, and other approximations of experimenta-
tion provide opportunities to practice the method of multiple working
hypotheses.
The land use example presented in the previous section provides an
oportunity for testing multiple working hypotheses from within rational
choice theory. The first step in conducting a rational choice analysis of
the conversion problem is to identify landowners' objectives in holding
undeveloped or wild land. One plausible objective is to maximize net
returns fom an investment. A second objective might be to maximize
the utility derived from ownership of wild land, subject to a cost con-
straint. Either of these objectives would be consistent with rational choice
theory.
One could use the theory to deduce testable implications related to
each landowner objective.37 If landowners are motivated by the first ob-
jective, then reduced tax assessments should have little effect on con-
version rates. This will be especially so when land values are high and
owners can realize large profits from development. However, if land-
owners hold wild land to derive extra-monetary benefits and if costs are
a constraint, then tax policy may be an important lever for manipulating
conversion rates. Thus rational choice theory can be used to generate
contradictory implications regarding the use of tax assessments to control
development in urbanizing areas.
In order to test these implications, one would have to specify hypotheses
37. Like economics, rational choice theory uses deductive reasoning to reach particular conclu-
sions. Hypotheses are deduced from general principles that are assumed to be true. The assumption
of individual rationality is the cornerstone of rational choice theory. Logical deduction permits the
extension of this assumption from market behavior to other aspects of decisionmaking. N. Frohlich
& J. Oppenheimer, supra note 25, at 3.
38. Attempting to prove a proposition true exemplifies the logical fallacy of affirming the con-
sequent. See M. Blaug, The Methodology of Economics 13-14 (1980).
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more precisely, define decision rules for hypothesis rejection, develop
valid and reliable measures of variables, and select an appropriate set of
observations. If an empirical test were conducted and the results indicated
that a reduction in assessed valuations was associated with reduced rates
of land use conversion, one could conclude that the observed landowners
were not motivated by the objective of profit maximization. These results
would lend support to the proposition that owners of undeveloped land
hold their land to satisfy extra-monetary desires and are subject to a cost
constraint. Of course this proposition can never be proven true;38 but if
it survives repeated tests against competing hypotheses, our confidence
in it will grow. The results of the initial empirical test would offer decision-
makers a tool with which to evaluate tax assessments as a policy instru-
ment. Subsequent tests against competing hypotheses from within rational
choice theory would suggest the most promising directions for devel-
opment of the theory. Such studies might reveal patterns regarding the
contexts in which particular kinds of objectives guide behavior. Tests
against hypotheses derived from other theories would offer a basis for
evaluating competing theories of individual decisionmaking.
The use of strong inference is neither a simple nor an unambiguous
process. Many practical problems make hypothesis testing and evaluation
of results difficult. Often critics of a particular test will argue that research
results reflect inappropriate test conditions (measurement theory, simpli-
fying assumptions, selection of observations) rather than the truth-value
of the test hypotheses. Even the most rigorously conducted research will
be subjected to such criticisms. 9 But as a body of evidence emerges, the
accuracy of the theory will become apparent.
McDavid refers to the approach outlined above as piecemeal crucial
testing.' The short run objective is to select the best theory in a specific
context. In this way, empirical results provide information for policy
makers. Accumulation of results from such tests eventually leads to re-
jection of theories or to development of higher level generalizations that
integrate competing theories. In this way policy analysis serves its second
objective, the development of social science.
39. This is an important reason that single studies are seldom sufficient to demonstrate that a
theory is inadequate. Any empirical test requires a set of auxiliary assumptions or hypotheses
regarding test conditions. An important task of research design is to minimize the extent to which
questions regarding auxiliary hypotheses interfere with the interpretation of results. For further
discussion of the role of auxiliary hypotheses in falsification, see Lakatos, Falsification and the
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 91-
195 (. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970). For a discussion of these issues related to social science,
see M. Blaug supra note 38; McDavid, Crucial Testing for the Study of Complex institutions, in
Problems of Theory in Policy Analysis (P Gregg ed. 1976).
40. McDavid, supra note 39.
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C. Methodological Development of the New Resource Economics
During the first years of the development of the new resource econom-
ics, proponents of the paradigm asserted their model, extended it to
explain diverse phenomena, and advocated policies consistent with it.
For example, in 1975, Baden and Stroup drew on economic theory to
argue that privatization of the national forests would contribute to equi-
table and efficient forest management." During the early 1980s subse-
quent papers by these and other authors strengthened the argument by
integrating elements of property rights economics and public choice the-
ory. 2 They also expanded the substantive range of concerns to include
water, wildlife, wilderness, and air as well as other resources. 3 Their
papers often used historical data to criticize government management of
natural resources and thus to demonstrate the plausibility of their argument
against the public sector. These data were used to support an argument
rather than to test (and potentially falsify) propositions derived from the
new resource economics. Thus early work in this school employed the
method of ruling theory."
More recent efforts by the new resource economists have involved
hypothesis testing.45 With few exceptions,' these papers have examined
only one hypothesis, one derived from the new resource economics,
usually asserting that public agencies maximize budgets or that public
agencies misallocate resources. Rules for hypothesis rejection are seldom
defined and evidence that would disconfirm the working hypothesis is
not sought. Thus the current status of research in the new resource eco-
41. Baden & Stroup, Private Rights, Public Choices, and the Management of National Forests,
2 W. Wildlands 5 (1975).
42. R. Stroup & J. Baden, supra note 26; see also papers in J. Baden & R. Stroup, supra note
27.
43. See supra note 2. See also Cuzan, A Critique of Collectivist Water Resoureces Planning, 32
W. Pol. Q. (1979); Johnson, Energy Resources, and Baden, Privatizing Wilderness Lands: The
Political Economy of Harmony and Good Will, both in Private Rights and Public Lands (P. Truluck
ed. 1983).
44. Early research conducted by the new resource economists illustrates how ruling theories differ
from Kuhn's conception of a "paradigm." (See supra note 36.) New resource economists have
worked within the paradigm established by neoclassical economists, but seldom sought to falsify
hypotheses deduced from this paradigm.
45. Gardner, Water Pricing and Rent Seeking in California Agriculture, and Smith, The Economic
Determinants and Consequences of Private and Public Ownership of Local Irrigation Facilities,
both in Water Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and the Environment (T. Anderson
ed. 1983); Johnson, U.S. Forest Service Policy and Its Budget, and Libecap, Regulatory Constraints
on Oil and Gas Production on Forest Service and BLM Lands, both in Forestlands: Public and
Private (R. Deacon & M. Johnson eds. 1985).
46. Gisser and Johnson provide an exception; they compare three explanations of the behavior
of a regional water district. The authors find that the district's behavior is best explained by viewing
it as an entity that "seeks to survive and expand," Institutional Restrictions on the Transfer of Water
Rights and the Survival of an Agency, in Water Rights 158 (T. Anderson ed. 1983).
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nomics is between the stage of ruling theory and the working hypothesis.
The new resource economists have developed a forceful argument in
favor of privatizing a spectrum of publicly-owned resources. In doing so
they have performed a service by expanding the range of policy options
that may be considered. Analysts and decisionmakers now regularly ex-
amine policy alternatives that involve market provision of services and
market-like arrangements in the public sector. The new resource econ-
omists have demonstrated the plausibility of their argument in some con-
texts. It remains for them to systematically evaluate implications of their
model by formulating and testing families of competing hypotheses.
IV. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND NATURAL RESOURCE
POLICY ANALYSIS
Rational choice theory lends itself to empirical testing. Its deductive
structure facilitates derivation of refutable implications and empirically-
based evaluation of the theory.47 While the new resource economists have
not fully exploited this feature, they have used elements of rational choice
theory to analyze numerous natural resource problems. In this section,
we argue that natural resource analysis will be most productive when it
reflects the social constitution of resources and suggest a research strategy
for exploiting the analytical insights generated by rational choice theory.
A. Natural Resources
Characteristic concerns of resource policy analysis derive from the
social constitution of natural resources. Analysts are accustomed to ca-
tegorizing resources in a variety of forms. They are fugitive and stationary,
renewable and depletable. Some are easily subject to capture by an in-
dividual, others not. But, most importantly, analysts have adopted natural
resources as a social science concept. The idea that natural resource is a
dynamic social science concept yields analytical power unavailable to
those who see resources as tangible, static substances.
The conventional use of the term resource is a prime example of what
Whitehead referred to as the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"-the
reification of an abstraction. People often refer to forage, timber, and
scenery as if these resources were tangible things. Zimmerman was one
of the first natural resource policy analysts to reject this common sense
view. He suggested the following definition:
The word "resource" does not refer to a thing or substance but
to a function which a thing or substance may perform or to an
operation in which it may take part, namely, the function or operation
47. See supra note 37.
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of attaining a given end such as satisfying a want. . . the word
"resource" is an abstraction reflecting human appraisal and relating
to a function or operation.48(emphasis in original)
The false impression that resources are things continues to be one of
the greatest obstacles to the advancement of research on natural resources.
Unlike tangible objects such as trees, resources such as timber change in
response to changes in societal tastes and values or changes in knowledge
and technology. New resources emerge and old resources are transformed
or disappear with societal changes such as the invention of new wood
processing technologies or the emergence of substitutes for raw materials
in certain end uses.
Hence, natural resource policy analysis focuses on the functions per-
formed by natural objects or processes. Attributes of natural resources
constrain the forms of use and management that are possible; thus con-
sideration of such attributes must be part of policy analysis. The manner
in which people use natural resources is also guided by social institutions,
especially property arrangements; thus the nature of social institutions is
a second focus of natural resource policy analysis.
Theories that address these concerns-attributes of resources and social
institutions (especially property arrangements)-are potentially valuable
tools for natural resource policy analysis. While the nature of social
institutions is a central element of most social theories, the attributes of
resources are not. Thus a theory that explicitly addresses such attributes
holds the promise of generating unique insights regarding natural re-
sources.
B. Exploiting Rational Choice Theory
The substantive focuses of rational choice theory (collective action,
characteristics of goods, institutions) indicate that it may be a useful tool
for natural resource analysis. Indeed rational choice theory provides means
to address numerous issues that are central to natural resource policy.
How are changes in the relative value of various water resources related
to changes in water law and in the agencies that administer law and
manage water development? How do different tenure rules affect energy
development? Rational choice theory provides an analytical framework
with which to address questions that relate the nature of resources, in-
stitutional arrangements, and resource allocation. To date, this framework
has been exploited only minimally.
The new resource economists have been the primary source of appli-
cations of rational choice theory to natural resource problems.Their con-
48. E. Zimmerman, World Resources and Industries: A Functional Appraisal of Agriculture and
Industrial Materials 7 (1951).
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tribution has been limited by their methodological approach. Because
their work has not included derivation and testing of multiple working
hypotheses, they have presented a narrow perspective on rational choice
theory. The theory permits other interpretations. For example, one element
of rational choice theory is that individuals are the appropriate unit of
analysis. Property rights economists demonstrated the importance of fo-
cusing on individuals rather than organizations. Yet much of the new
resource economics uses the government bureau as the unit of analysis
and asserts that bureaus maximize budgets because bureaucrats are self-
interested. Johnson presented some empirical evidence to argue that the
Forest Service behaves as a budget maximizing bureau. 9 Johnson fol-
lowed Niskanen in asserting that utility maximizing bureaucrats will al-
ways maximize budgets."0 Johnson, like Niskanen, offered little empirical
or logical support for this assertion. We know that the assertion that
managers of private firms maximize personal wealth does not always
imply that firms maximize profits. Perhaps bureaus composed of utility
and wealth maximizing bureaucrats maximize something other than budg-
ets. Thus there is an opportunity to test competing hypotheses from within
the theory. Considerable recent work in rational choice theory has sought
to model bureaucracies in the context of different behavioral assump-
tions.5  While the budget maximization claim may be true for some
bureaus, there is no reason that it need be true of all.
The empirical task is to specify conditions under which it would be
true. This effort will be facilitated by attention to a second element of
rational choice theory, the presumption that institutional arrangements
matter. Not all private firms are the same and not all government bureaus
are the same. Rational choice theory tells us that the structural and con-
textual differences among them are important. Thus analyses ought to
examine the rules and procedures that characterize individual bureaus.
They create different kinds of incentives. Organizational structures and
environments create alternative paths for the maximizing bureaucrat.5 2
There is a wealth of scholarship that analyzes resource bureaus. 3 This
49. Johnson, supra note 43.
50. W. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971).
51. See Bendor and Moe, An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
(1985); Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. (1984); Wood, Principals,
Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. (1988).
52. J. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation 372 (1980).A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (1966).
Wilson argued that self-interested bureaucrats may pursue at least three kinds of objectives, career
advancement within an agency, political power, and professional stature. Similarly, Downs, arguing
from a rational choice perspective, contended that bureaucrats have complex sets of goals and'that
different goals generate different kinds of behavior. The structure of a particular bureaucracy affects
the chances for success and thus the prevalence of each type of bureaucrat.
53. See, e.g., J. Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics (1974); H. Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (1960);
P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (1949).
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scholarship should be integral to any rational choice analysis of agency
behavior.
Another source of competing hypotheses from within rational choice
theory is the focus on the nature of goods. The theory offers concepts
with which to trace changes in natural resources. What attributes of
streams become important when the source of irrigation water gains value
as an element of wildlife habitat? How has the resource changed? Are
some institutional arrangements appropriate for management of an irri-
gation system but not of wildlife habitat? Concepts such as costliness of
exclusion and jointness of consumption can be used to generate hypoth-
eses that are relevant to these questions.
If policy analysts are to make optimum use of rational choice theory,
it will be necessary to clearly define empirical claims and to systematically
test them. These tests ought to pit competing branches of rational choice
theory against one another, while also challenging basic assumptions by
pitting hypotheses derived from rival theories against those of rational
choice theory." The tests may employ historical data, quasi-experimental
methods, or econometric techniques. But these studies need to clearly
define criteria for rejecting hypotheses and then to accept the conse-
quences of the confrontation of data with theoretical claims.
If we are to get the most out of rational choice theory we need to
repeatedly challenge basic assumptions when extending the theory to new
policy problems or institutional contexts. Rational choice theory readily
permits development and testing of multiple working hypotheses. The
theory's contribution to policy analysis will increase as we move toward
this stage of methodological development.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our purpose in this paper has been to assess the value of rational choice
theory as a tool for resource policy analysis. We have argued that strong
inference-the derivation and testing of competing hypotheses-is an
appropriate methodological strategy for policy analysis and that rational
choice theory can be used in conjunction with this strategy. Furthermore,
the parallel concerns of natural resource analysis (attributes of resources,
54. Sproule-Jones, supra note 14, has offered an explication of rational choice theory as it relates
to natural resources. We agree with him regarding the potential value of rational choice for natural
resource analysis. We disagree with Sproule-Jones regarding the appropriate methodology for re-
alizing that potential. Sproule-Jones' primary concern is with making rational choice "impregnable
to assaults of rival theories," id. at 801. Thus, for Sproule-Jones, testing of multiple working
hypotheses generated from within rational choice theory would be an appropriate strategy. His
argument implies that empirical tests of contradictory hypotheses derived from rival theories would
be inappropriate. In contrast, our objectives relate to useful policy analysis and the development of
social science rather than the defense of a single theory. We have argued that these ends are best
served by a broadly conceived strategy of strong inference.
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social institutions) and of rational choice theory (characteristics of goods,
social institutions) offer the possibility of generating important insights.
To date, the bulk of rational choice analyses of natural resource issues
has been presented by the new resource economists. These analyses have
focused on advocating a set of public policies rather than on testing
theoretical claims using strong inference. Two consequences of this method
have been the development of policy prescriptions with weak empirical
foundations and a narrow interpretation of rational choice theory.
Rational choice theory can be most productively employed through
strong inference. By conducting empirical tests of competing hypotheses
we build an evidentiary base. We have no illusions that such evidence
will resolve arguments about which policies are best. But it will move
political science a small step toward consensus on which empirical claims
are clearly false. It will also provide information to decisionmakers about
what kinds of policies are possible and what their consequences will be.
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